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We analyze the effects of founding conditions on the survival of new firms. We allow the effects of 
founding conditions to be transitory and estimate how long such effects last. Our findings indicate 
that founding effects are important determinants of exit rates. Moreover, in most cases, their effect 
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The notion that the conditions in which a firm is born may have a substantial effect on its 
performance is one that has received attention from different angles. While some studies, mainly 
inspired in the Organizational Ecology literature, emphasize the impact that environmental 
conditions at the time of founding may exert upon the survival of firms (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989, Romanelli, 1989, Hannan, 1998, Ranger-Moore, 1997, Mitchell, 1994, Henderson, 1999), 
other studies have focused on the impact that those strategic choices at founding time may have 
upon the performance of firms. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) showed that founding teams 
exert permanent effects upon the performance of firms, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo (1994) 
found that the initial stocks of financial and human capital were good predictors of firm 
performance including survival, while Kimberly (1979) concluded that environmental conditions, 
the founder's personality, and the initial strategic choices exert an enduring effect on the behavior 
of organizations. 
However, in many cases, founding and subsequent conditions can be similar. By definition, 
structural conditions do not change rapidly, and a tendency for organizations to stick with their 
strategies may hinder their rapid change (Miller and Chen 1994, Kratz and Zajac 2001). Failing 
to account for the effect of current conditions may lead one to draw the misleading conclusion 
that founding conditions are responsible for the observed variation in performance.  
In this paper we develop a model that enables us to test the importance of both founding and 
subsequent conditions upon the survival of firms. Furthermore, while the literature has developed 
the hypothesis that founding conditions matter, to our knowledge there is no study that has 
analyzed how long the effect of these founding conditions upon survival may persist. Our 
analysis will specifically allow for the effect of founding conditions to gradually vanish over 
time, and we will be able to provide estimates of the degree of persistence of the effect of 
founding conditions.  
Our results suggest that firm strategies, market conditions and macroeconomic conditions are 
all important determinants of survival. We further find that, in general, observed founding values 
of these variables matter more than current values and, in most cases, the magnitude of the impact   4
of founding effects on survival does not diminish rapidly over the first 5 - 10 years of a new 
firm's life.  
Our study has implications for managers and policy makers alike. For managers our results 
mean that a great deal of care should be taken in preparing the founding of a firm. The choices 
made at inception have long lasting effects and may not be easy to undo. For policy makers, the 
results are important because they suggest that the kind of support needed by struggling young 
firms would have to be tailored, cohort by cohort, to the circumstances of their birth. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we outline the basic issues that we will be 
concerned with, and try to weave together two different literatures that have addressed them in 
somewhat different ways. In this section we develop our basic hypotheses about which effects 
should matter for survival and discuss the determinants of survival. Section III discusses the data 
that are the basis of our empirical analysis, while in Section IV the empirical model is presented. 
The results are discussed in Section V and finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. THE ISSUES 
The effect of environmental conditions on the performance of firms has been the subject of 
much interesting work developed to explain the often fairly large shake-outs which occur in many 
relatively young markets. There are two rather separate streams of research in the strategy and 
organization literature on firm survival (Ranger-Moore, 1997, Mitchell, 1994, Henderson, 1999, 
Agarwal, et al. 2004, Delmar and Shane. 2004, Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2004). The first 
stream originates in organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1977). Central to this literature 
is the concept of density (Hannan and Freeman 1987), which suggests that exit rates increase with 
increases in competition and decrease with increases in legitimacy of organizations. The second 
stream of research has its origins in evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982). Scholars 
in this tradition stress that, over their life cycles, industries go through a number of stages in 
which technology and market conditions vary, determining how easy it is to enter and survive in 
a given market (Gort.and Klepper 1982, Klepper 1996, 2002, Suárez and Utterback 1995). 
While in its original formulation, the density argument posits that changes in competition in 
one period should affect all organizations in pretty much the same way, the argument was further   5
extended, suggesting that density at the time of founding could have imprinting effects upon 
organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965) and thus have delayed effects upon their survivability (Carroll 
and Hannan, 1989). The density delay argument thus suggests that organizations founded in 
periods when markets are very crowded (e.g. with other entrants and incumbents) are likely to 
have persistently higher age specific rates of mortality than those founded in less demanding 
periods when the market is less densely populated. Thus, if a population becomes very large in a 
certain period, organizations founded in that period are likely to be much weaker, ceteris paribus, 
and the adverse founding conditions into which they are born are likely to create an enhanced 
stream of exit (and, as a consequence, a falling off in population size from the peak previously 
established). There are two reasons for this effect. The first is that firms founded under such 
conditions may suffer from a “liability of scarcity”. Organizations created in unfavorable 
circumstances are unlikely to be anywhere near their optimal structural configuration and, in 
addition, may not be able to find the right kind of resources, make the correct organization 
specific investments, or design the right kinds of routines. The second argument – “tight niche 
packing” – suggests that new firms founded in crowded market conditions can get pushed into 
unpromising niches, which may be transitory or may just lead them to develop knowledge and 
routines which are so specialized that they will never be able to subsequently reposition 
themselves into more favorable parts of the market later on. 
An implication of the arguments given above is that the state of the environment at the time 
of birth largely determines the strategic choices of firms, but even if one is willing to accept that 
management may have some degree of discretion in deciding on their firms’ strategies, there may 
still be imprinting effects, due to organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Therefore, 
even if initial strategic choices were appropriate, as firms age and the environment changes the 
initial choices of firms may become less and less suited to the new environment. However, the 
routines developed by firms until that moment, and that eased the tasks of dealing with the firms' 
daily operations, may create rigidities that make the firms ill-suited to cope with changes in their 
environments (Hannan 1998). The fact that a strategy has been successful in one moment in time 
can even exacerbate these rigidities. Managers’ reluctance to abandon strategies that have been 
successful in the past leads to the continuity of the once successful strategies, even if the 
environment changes radically and those strategies are no longer appropriate (Audia, Locke and 
Smith 2000).   6
In the rest of this section we will develop the specific hypotheses to be tested in this study. 
We will start by developing the hypotheses concerning the environment in which firms operate, 
which will be followed by those relative to the strategies pursued by firms. For each factor 
affecting survival, we will discuss the rationale to expect the survival of firms to be related to 
current and founding conditions. The general hypothesis underlying the study is that, even after 
controlling for current conditions, founding conditions may have a long-lived impact upon 
survival. By long-lived we mean that the effect persists for a number of years; we do not 
necessarily mean that the effect of founding conditions will persist forever. The estimation of the 
longevity of each specific effect is an empirical issue, and will be left to the section in which our 
estimation strategy is discussed. 
THE ENVIRONMENT  
In its original formulation in the context of the organizational ecology literature, population 
density (the count of the number of firms in the market) is the most important determinant of how 
favorable market conditions are for new entrants. However, the notion of “crowding”, which lies 
at the core of the arguments suggests that it is population density relative to market size which 
matters most, and this introduces a broader range of factors that might be important determinants 
of how favorable environmental conditions are for a particular cohort of firms (see Nickel 2004 
for a survey of studies that analyze the death of organizations within the organizational ecology 
tradition and discuss the different variables that have been suggested as complements to the initial 
density). As we work with several industries with quite different structures, rather than with the 
evolution of a single industry over time, we will use industry concentration as a proxy for the 
degree of competition in the market. However, the same argument that says that organizations 
may be imprinted by the conditions they confront when they are established, can be extended to 
the overall business conditions, that is, the state of the business cycle (or other macroeconomic 
conditions). 
Concentration 
Two types of argument can be made about the effect of the degree of competition in the 
market upon survival prospects. On the one hand, Organizational Ecology scholars (e. g. Hannan 
and Carrol 1992), maintain that competition is a force that increases mortality. At low levels of 
density, an increase in the number of firms operating in a market translates into increased   7
legitimacy and this will favor survival. After a certain threshold, however, further increases in the 
number of firms lead to increased competition and this leads to increased mortality.  
While economists certainly agree that competitive markets (that is, those populated by a 
large number of firms) exert a strong disciplinary effect and drive inefficient firms out of the 
market, the Industrial Organization literature recognizes a complex effect of concentration. On 
the one hand, it argues that market concentration facilitates collusion, thus creating room for 
excess profits and making it easier to survive. On the other hand, in highly concentrated markets 
incumbents have higher profits to defend and coordination among them is easier. Incumbents 
may, therefore, be more likely to retaliate against entrants (Bunch and Smiley 1992). However, 
for reaping the benefits of being in a highly concentrated market, established firms may not 
maintain an aggressive behavior in a permanent fashion. Entrants that manage to survive their 
earliest days in the market, may be accepted in the club of incumbents and become protected by 
the umbrella effect of concentration.  
Perhaps because of these conflicting effects, the available evidence relating the survival of 
firms to market concentration is inconclusive. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) report a negative 
and statistically significant effect of market concentration on the survival of new firms, but 
Romanelli (1989), Mata and Portugal (1994) and Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004) found 
that conventional concentration measures have an insignificant impact upon survival. Sharma and 
Kesner (1996) also report an insignificant effect of concentration upon survival, but found that 
the (negative) effect of concentration increases with the scale of entry. The arguments above lead 
us to hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 1C Current concentration facilitates survival . 
With respect to the effect of concentration at the time of entry, we will have two disparate 
hypotheses, originating respectively from Organizational Ecology and Industrial Organization. If 
the Organizational Ecology argument holds, entry in less competitive markets should have 
permanent life enhancing effects. 
This ecological argument was extended by Swaminathan (1996). He argues that unfavorable 
founding conditions may lead to a quick and immediate shake-out of “unfit” firms, leaving those 
who survive their first year (or so) with a high average fitness level. A cohort that has   8
experienced such a “trial by fire” is likely to have lower failure rates, meaning that adverse 
founding conditions and immediate selection may be followed by lower (not higher) exit 
probabilities for firms in that cohort (Swaminathan, 1996). This view leads us to expect that 
Hypothesis 1Fa Industry concentration at founding increases the probability of survival 
during the first years only. 
If the Industrial Organization collusive argument holds, entry and survival during the first 
years can be particularly difficult in highly concentrated industries. The nature of the argument 
implies that this effect should not be long lived, as concentration protects established firms. As 
soon as entrants become part of the established set of firms, the protective umbrella of 
concentration should dominate and protect them. This leads us to the prediction that 
Hypothesis 1Fb Industry concentration at founding decreases the probability of survival 
during the first years only.  
Entry Rates 
Another element of the competitive structure of a market is the extent of entry in that market. 
Organizational ecologists and economists here agree that markets with high entry rates are those 
in which the highest exit rates are to be expected. The Organizational Ecology argument is that 
large entry flows increase density in the market and one should therefore expect high exit rates as 
a consequence. Industrial Organization Economics arguments, on the other hand, emphasize that 
entry barriers are exit barriers, and that the magnitude and irreversibility associated with 
investments, which deter entry, also hinder exit (Eaton and Lipsey 1980). Finally, evolutionary 
economists argue that there are distinct stages in the industry evolution, and that each stage 
exhibits different entry and exit rates. In the entrepreneurial regime (Winter 1994), the kind of 
knowledge needed to fuel innovation lies outside the industry and new firms need to be created in 
order for innovations to be possible. At the same time, no standards exist in the industry, and 
firms compete by experimenting with new ideas. Many of these ideas are unsuccessful, and those 
firms that promoted them are forced to exit. With the emergence of dominant designs (Suárez and 
Utterback 1995), industries enter the routinized regime, in which innovations are more of an 
incremental type and come from established firms. Fewer firms enter, but fewer exit as well (Gort   9
and Klepper 1982).  
Overall, there is plenty of evidence that industries where entry is easy are also industries 
where exit is more likely. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) found that there is a very strong 
positive correlation between the flows of entry and exit across markets and many studies 
(surveyed in Siegfried and Evans 1994) have reported similar findings for the determinants of 
entry and exit. Mata and Portugal (1994) observed that this is due, in large part, to the early exit 
of entrants in industries characterized by high entry flows, a finding that was confirmed by 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004). The effect of current entry upon the survival of firms 
comes from competition effect, which is shared by Organizational Ecology and Industrial 
Organization. Therefore, we will hypothesize  
Hypothesis 2C Current entry rates decrease the probability of survival.  
Comprehensive evidence for the US, reported by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) 
show that that there is a positive correlation between flows of entry over time. Once current 
conditions have been controlled for, only Organizational Ecology arguments support a permanent 
effect of entry rates upon survival. Indeed, both the tight niche packing and the resource scarcity 
are likely to be particularly relevant when entry rates are high, as entrants are more likely to be 
direct competitors to other entrants than established firms. Therefore, we hypothesize 
Hypothesis 2F Entry rates at founding persistently decrease the probability of survival.  
The macroeconomic environment  
The overall state of the economy has long been indicated as an important force driving firms 
out of business. When times are tough, established firms may face difficulties and the competitive 
pressure from new firms may lead them to exit. The first reason why current macroeconomic 
conditions may matter is because current conditions change expectations about the future. If the 
state of affairs in a market today is taken as an indication of future adverse state of affairs, firms 
may decide to exit in response to an unfavorable change in current conditions. Unfavorable 
current macroeconomic conditions may also lead firms to exit if they suffer from cash 
constraints, and if they cannot secure the funds required for survival, even though they would   10
wish to remain active despite adverse conditions. 
Recent research, however, indicates that this effect may be less important than has been 
previously believed. Heterogeneity among firms may insulate established firms from the 
replacement threat posed by new firms (Bertin,  Bresnahan, and Raff 1996). Recessions also 
affect the rate of new firm creation. By reducing the rate of new firm creation, recessions 
alleviate the pressure exerted upon established units (Caballero and Hammour 1994). In fact, 
studies focusing on the relationship between entry and macroeconomic conditions (Highfield and 
Smiley 1987, Mata 1996) found a stronger correlation than those focusing on exit and survival 
(Boeri and Bellmann 1995, Ilmakunnas and  Topi 1999). The results of these recent studies thus 
suggest that it is exactly the newest firms that are more likely to suffer in recessions. New firms 
are more likely to suffer from cash constraints than established ones (Cabral and Mata 2003), as 
they did not have the time to develop legitimacy in financial markets (Diamond 1989). As cash is 
typically scarcer during recessions than in prosperity, recessions are likely to affect particularly 
the newest firms. All of these reasons lead us to hypothesize that   
 Hypothesis 3C Unfavorable current macroeconomic conditions decrease the probability of 
survival. 
The studies mentioned above focused on the effect of current business conditions upon entry 
and exit. Macroeconomic conditions prevalent at the time of entry may also affect survival. 
Highfield and Smiley (1987) showed that periods of high firm creation follow periods of 
relatively depressed conditions. Individuals that are unemployed are known to be more likely to 
create new firms than those that have a job (Evans and Leighton 1989), but firms created by 
unemployed also face a higher probability of failure (Pfeiffer and Reize 2000). This suggests that 
it may be relevant to account for the macroeconomic conditions at the time of entry. If industry 
conditions can imprint new firms because they are forced to go into niches or use inferior 
resources, imprinting should apply to the conditions in which new firms are pushed if founded in 
times of depression.  
Hypothesis 3F Favorable macroeconomic conditions at founding persistently increase the 
probability of survival.    11
FIRM STRATEGIES  
With respect to the impact of firm strategies upon survival, ecological and economic 
arguments offer two rather different views. Ecological arguments stress inertia; emphasizing that 
selection tends to favor those firms that remain highly immutable (Hannan and Freeman 1984). 
According to this view, the greater the magnitude of change, the greater the probability of exit. 
Economic arguments, in contrast, emphasize the adaptive role of change. Confronted with 
suboptimal positions, firms change – and try to change for the better. Those which are successful 
survive and prosper. Those which are less successful in setting up new directions and 
implementing them, wither and exit. For example, Levinthal (1997) emphasizes the ability of 
firms to adapt to changing environments as being crucial to shape the process of selection and 
survival; it is not only the magnitude of change that matters, but rather the fit of the performed 
change that matters the most. While many authors acknowledge that change will be more likely 
when past performance has not been good (Boeker 1989, Miller and Chen 1994), the outcome of 
this change upon performance may vary according to the circumstances (Zajac, Kraatz and 
Bresser 2000). 
Firm size 
Large firms have been found to experience higher survival probabilities than their smaller 
counterparts (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989, Audretsch and Mahmood 1994, Mata and 
Portugal 1994, Mitchell 1994, Haverman 1995, Sharma and Kesner 1996). There are several 
reasons why this may be so.  
One such reason is that larger firms are more likely to be closer to the minimum efficient 
scale needed to operate efficiently in a market, and are therefore less likely to be vulnerable than 
smaller firms that operate further up the cost curve (Audretsch and Mahmood 1994). Large firms 
may be larger than some small firms, not because the two necessarily want to operate at different 
scales, but because they have different access to funds (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988). 
Those that experience the greatest cash constraints will, thus, be forced to operate at a smaller 
scale. Even if this does not push smaller firms into a cost disadvantage via economies of scale, it 
will put them in a tougher position to survive unexpected temporary difficulties than competitors 
with better access to funds (Zingales 1998). By the same token, large firms are also typically 
more diversified than smaller firms, and this may improve their survival prospects by reducing   12
risk and keeping alive options in one market should activities go sour in another. Finally, larger 
firms may be more efficient, not because they operate at a different point on the cost curve, but 
because they may have different managerial capabilities. Better capabilities translate into lower 
costs at any given size and, these lower costs lead firms to choose to operate at a large scale 
(Lucas 1978). The observed size of firms is thus a consequence of their superior ability. All of 
these reasons suggest that current size is likely to be related to the survival of firms, and we 
therefore predict that  
Hypothesis 4C Larger firms have lower probabilities of exit.  
In the standard economic model of the evolution of firms and industries (Jovanovic, 1982), 
current firm size is the only information that matters for predicting survival. In this model, firms 
start with no prior knowledge about their efficiency. As time goes by and firms observe their 
performance in the marketplace, they gradually learn about their efficiency. Those firms that are 
observed to be successful grow, while those that are less lucky contract. Current size at any given 
moment incorporates all of the firms’ histories and nothing further is required to predict survival. 
The critical feature that makes initial decisions irrelevant in Jovanovic’s model is that all 
adjustments are instantaneous. Expectations about efficiency are identical at start-up, therefore, 
all firms start with identical sizes. Expectations are then fully adjusted at every round and the 
subsequent capacity and production decisions are also fully updated in conformity with these 
expectations. While these assumptions of the model allow focusing on what is central in the 
analysis, they are unlikely to hold true in reality.  
At inception, firms have different beliefs about their ability to compete, and these beliefs 
underlie their choice of entry size. Frank (1988) argues that firms that enter at larger scales are 
those that have more optimistic ex-ante expectations of success. Consequently, they are apt to 
endure poor performance for a longer time. Larger firms will also be able to suffer losses for 
longer periods than smaller ones, if their initial sizes were determined by the relative severity of 
cash constraints.  Furthermore, while the liquidity constraints argument was initially established 
with relation to mature firms (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988), the impact of cash 
constraints should be greatest during the earliest ages of firms, when information asymmetries are 
more severe and firms still were not able to develop a reputation (Diamond 1989). The effect of 
initial decisions may also persist because strategic decisions frequently involve the deployment of   13
resources that cannot be later reallocated, that is, which are sunk. When investment costs are 
sunk, there may be little point in reversing a decision, as costs cannot be recovered. Therefore, 
even if it proves to be clear that a given decision was not a wise one, ex post the firm’s best 
option may be to stick with it anyway (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Finally, even if a firm finds it 
optimal to adjust, it may be optimal to do it gradually.  This may be because when sunk costs are 
involved, it may be better to wait until the uncertainty is resolved (Cabral 1995), or because the 
required resources may not be available to the firm in sufficient amounts, a point which was 
emphasized by Penrose (1959). Writing in the context of the growth of firms, Penrose argued that 
lack of managerial resources would put limits on the ability of firms to expand and that, once 
firms are in a given position, it may be difficult to change this position very rapidly. Indeed, firms 
are observed to converge gradually to their desired size (Bogner, Thomas and McGee 1996).  
Even if initial firm size is not at all important once all the adjustments are complete, the fact 
that firms adjust gradually toward their desired size, makes it relevant to know their departing 
point as well as their current position. If there are adjustment costs in the process of firm growth, 
the current size of growing firms will be an underestimate of the firm's desired size. Thus, the fact 
that a firm has grown in the past signals that it has been performing well, and that it would wish 
to be larger than it currently is. Consequently, it should have lower exit probabilities than its 
current size alone indicates (Mata, Portugal and Guimarães 1995). Therefore we predict that  
Hypothesis 4F Firms that had larger initial size have lower persistent probabilities of exit.  
Human capital 
If market processes select the most able organizations, the possession of valuable knowledge 
or skills should improve the chances of firms. The Resource-Based View of the Firm has long 
stressed that the ability of firms to survive and compete successfully is largely determined by the 
extent to which firms develop firm-specific assets, that cannot be imitated by competitors and 
which provide the basis for their competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984, Barney, 1991). Also, 
recent studies on entry, post-entry penetration, and survival show that the ability to develop and 
exploit such assets is crucial for the post-entry performance of firms (Burgelman, 1994, Bogner, 
Thomas and McGee 1996, Chang, 1996). A number of authors have pointed out that human 
capital, rather than physical capital, provides the basis for sustained competitive advantage 
(Youndt et al., 1996), as “physical technology, whether it takes the form of machine tools or   14
robotics or complex information management systems, is by itself imitable” (Barney, 1991, p. 
110). Indeed, assets that constitute the basis for superior performance cannot be imitable or 
tradeable, and knowledge assets are one of the few classes of assets that are not tradeable (Teece, 
1998). Previous studies found human capital to be a good predictor of survival (Mata and 
Portugal, 2002, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994, Gimeno et al., 1997).   
Hypothesis 5C Firms employing more skilled labor have lower probabilities of exit.  
What makes human capital difficult to imitate or trade is that the knowledge it embodies is, 
for the most part, tacit. Tacit knowledge is more difficult to transfer than explicit knowledge, and 
the higher the qualifications of labor the greater the complexity and tacitness of the knowledge it 
embodies (Simonin 2004). McEvily and Chakravarthy (2002) found that the more complex and 
tacit knowledge is, the greater is the protection that it offers to imitation of the firm’s major 
product improvements by their competitors.  
Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is best transferred through rich communication rather 
than through more explicit media (Nadler at al., 2003) and in contexts in which there exist strong 
ties between members of the groups (Uzzi, 1997), because strong ties are more likely to be 
governed by the norms of reciprocity (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003). The transfer of 
knowledge is, therefore, likely to be hindered in a context in which there is rapid labor turnover, 
as reported by Hatch and Dyer  (2004). They found that firms with high labor turnover 
significantly underperform their competitors, thus suggesting that it takes time before the 
accumulated knowledge can be transferred between the firm and the new hires. Burton and 
Beckman (2007) found that when the first holder of a new functional position in a firm has an 
atypical working experience, the subsequent holders of these positions experience shorter tenures 
than would otherwise be expected. They interpreted this finding as evidence of imprinting at the 
job level, which corroborates the argument that it may be difficult to transfer knowledge within 
the firm if high labor turnover is observed. All the problems associated with the difficulty of 
transfer of knowledge are likely to be aggravated if the qualitative composition of labor changes 
from start-up to the development stages, and if labor becomes significantly more or less skilled.  
Another problem with changing the labor skill composition, or with changes in another 
highly tacit asset for that matter, is that the observed changes may overstate the true change that 
goes on deeply in the firm. Knowledge in an organization is embedded in its individual   15
members, but also in the organization rules, routines, cultures, structures and technologies 
(Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003), some of which may not change as fast as new members 
enter and old members exit the firm. Improvement of labor skills may thus not be accompanied 
by contemporaneous changes at all levels that determine the actual performance, and those rules, 
routines, cultures, structures and technologies that were created as a consequence of initial human 
resources decisions may last even if these decisions are changed. 
Studies analyzing the impact of initial conditions on subsequent performance have focused 
mainly on founders (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo 1994, 
Kimberly 1979, Nelson 2003) and found a persistent influence of founders’ characteristics, 
namely their human capital. The evolution of these characteristics was not accounted for possibly 
because, in most cases, the characteristics that were analyzed are not amenable to change. Our 
sample allows us to analyze the impact of the whole stock of human capital in the firm, and we 
hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 5F Firms that employed more skilled labor at founding have persistent lower 
probabilities of exit.  
III. THE DATA 
The data used in this paper were obtained from an annual survey which has been conducted 
by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment since 1982. The survey has two characteristics that 
make it particularly suitable for the analysis of firm entry and survival. First, it covers all firms 
employing paid labor in Portugal. Second, it has a longitudinal dimension, i.e.,  firms are 
identified by a unique number, which allows individual firms to be followed over time. We 
worked with the original raw data files from 1982 to 1995, which include over 100, 000 firms in 
each year. 
As we have worked directly with raw files, we were able to compute entry and survival 
measures ourselves. This could be done easily because firms are identified in the survey by 
numbers, which are assigned sequentially when firms first report to the survey. New firms were 
identified by comparing firms' identifiers with the highest identification number in the file in the 
previous year. To avoid the inclusion of false entries, we use information on the admission dates   16
of the workers to exclude firms whose worker with the longest tenure exceeds two years. This 
enabled us to track 118,114 new firm start-ups during the period 1983-1993. These starting and 
ending dates were chosen on the basis of the available data. We started in 1983 because our data 
begin in 1982 and we need to know the largest number in the previous year file. We stopped in 
1993 because, as we are interested in measuring lifetime survival, we need to have data on a latter 
date (but see below).  
The time of exit is found by identifying the moment when firms cease to report to the survey. 
With such a large database, there are inevitably some coding errors in the files. To be on the safe 
side in identifying exit with such a database, we performed some data editing upon the original 
data file. In particular, we required that a firm be absent from the file for at least two years in 
order to be classified as a closure. A temporary exit may occur for a number of reasons other than 
cessation of activity, a very likely reason being that the survey form was not received in the 
Ministry of Employment before the date when the recording operations were closed. 
Accordingly, we edited the status of firms that were temporarily absent from the files for one 
year. That is, firms that were in the files in years t-1 and t+1 were considered to be active in year t 
even if they were not actually in the file. The firm's record was amended for that year, 
employment being imputed as the average of employment in years t-1 and t+1. Therefore, for a 
closure to be recorded in t-1 a firm has to be absent from the file in t and t+1. For this reason, in 
our subsequent analysis we use data only until 1993, although our data files go until 1995. Data 
from 1995 are used only to check the presence of the firm in 1994, and the last year for which we 
can identify an exit is 1993.  
Our data end in 1993 for all firms, irrespective of their starting time, meaning that the 
maximum potential age that individual firms can reach is different for each cohort. Whereas firms 
from the 1983 cohort can reach a maximum of eleven years of life, the ones from the 1991 cohort 
can reach, at most, two years. An obvious consequence of this is that, while the exit rates for the 
first and second cohorts are estimated using data from the seven years, the survival rates of 
subsequent cohorts are estimated using fewer years. In particular, our estimates for the exit rate 
after ten years are produced solely with data from the 1983 and 1984 cohorts. 
Table 1 shows the number of firms in each cohort and the survival rates in each of the years 
subsequent to entry. Data constraints (explained below) forced us to exclude the cohort of firms   17
created in 1990. The remaining cohorts display comparable patterns in terms of survival, one 
third of the total number of firms leaving during the second and third years of life, and only one 
third remaining active after nine years. 
For each firm in our sample, we computed measures of size and a proxy for their stock of 
human capital. The most serious shortcoming of our database is perhaps that the only reliable 
measure of the size of firms available is the firms' number of employees (the data were originally 
designed to collect information on the labor market). Therefore, firm size is measured here by 
employment (number of workers). To proxy the firm's human capital, we computed the 
proportion of college graduates among the firm's labor force. For each firm, these variables were 
computed for every year they appear in the data. Because there is no information available for the 
workforce for the 1990 survey, human capital variables were interpolated for this year (taking the 
average value for 1989 and 1991). For firms that were created in 1990, there is no reasonable way 
of estimating these variables and, consequently, these firms were excluded from our analysis. We 
also computed the Herfindhal index of concentration and the entry and exit rates, defined as the 
total number of entrants/exitors divided by the total number of firms in the (5 digit) industry, as 
proxies for the competitive conditions of the markets in which the firms in our sample operated. 
Finally, we also use GDP growth to characterize the macreconomic environment at the time of 
entry and at each moment thereafter. GDP growth is available from official sources (descriptive 
statistics in Table 2). 
All of these variables exhibit a considerable degree of persistence over time (Table 3). 
Correlations between the values of each independent variable at the time of founding and the 
same variable later in time are always positive and significant. They are, however, clearly 
different from one, thus indicating that there is a significant amount of divergence between 
conditions prevailing at the time of entry and those prevailing at later moments.  
IV. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
We are interested in estimating the probability that firms exit when they reach a certain age. 
For those firms that have not exited at the end of our period of analysis, we do not have 
information on how long they are going to last. This is known in the statistical literature as right 
censoring, as for those firms we know only that they survive longer than the age they had when   18
we cease to observe them. Thus, in our analysis of the survival of new firms, we need to employ a 
statistical model that is capable of accommodating such incomplete durations. Although a variety 
of such models exist, we employ a semi-parametric hazard model, because such models enable us 
to characterize the exit process more rigorously than is possible with the conventional 
approaches, such as Probit or Logit analysis. In particular, this methodology enables us to study 
how the exit rates evolve over time and the way in which such rates are affected by both firm and 
sectoral characteristics, as well as by the macroeconomic environment. 
As explained above, our data on the duration of firms come from an annual survey. This 
means that we know only whether or not a firm is active at the survey dates and, therefore, our 
measured durations are grouped into yearly intervals. For firms that exited during the survey 
period, all we know is that their durations are expressed in increments of one-year length. For 
those that were still operating at the end of the survey period, the relevant information is that their 
duration exceeded the lower limit of the last observed duration. Such a sampling plan is properly 
accommodated in the framework of discrete duration models, of which a rigorous exposition can 
be found in Lancaster (1990). 
Thus, the statistical model that we work with is a semi-parametric discrete proportional 
hazards model, which can be formally represented by 
(1)   log h(t|x)= λt + βx, for t=1, ..., k ,  
where the left-hand side variable is simply the logarithm of the hazard rate (that is, the log of the 
probability that the firm exits at time t, given that it survived until t-1). The parameters λt identify 
the baseline hazard function providing the (log of) yearly exit rates for a firm whose covariates 
denoted by the vector x assume a zero value. β is, of course, a vector of regression coefficients. 
Different specifications of model (1) can be written depending on the beliefs about what 
causes exit. One of the simplest versions of (1) that is possible to write is a model where x is a 
vector of variables that describe the current idiosyncratic and market conditions facing every firm 
which operates in the same market, which we will denote by xt.  
(2)   log h(t|xt)= λt + βxt,    19
There are, however, two sources of heterogeneity that may cause exit and that need to be 
considered: current heterogeneity among firms, that is the one which is based on differences that 
exist in period t; and heterogeneity that accrues from differences that existed at the moment when 
firms were created, that is from conditions prevalent in period t = 0. Heterogeneity induced by 
differences in founding conditions includes those conditions that are cohort specific, i.e. which 
take a common value for all firms in the same cohort, such as macroeconomic or industry-wide 
factors and those which are specific to each firm. Using x0 to denote founding conditions, 
regardless of whether they are firm or cohort specific, inclusion of these variables generalizes (1) 
to  
(3)   log h(t|xt , x0)= λ t + βxt + γx0. 
In this equation γ is the set of parameters to be estimated that measure the impact of founding 
conditions on survival conditional upon the effect that current conditions, xt, have on survival. If 
founding effects are not important, then γ = 0, while if current conditions do not matter, then β = 
0. A useful reparameterization of equation (3) is  
(4)   log h(t|∆xt , x0)= λ t + β∆xt + θx0, 
which expresses the probability of exit as a function of the initial conditions (x0) and of the 
changes in these conditions from birth to the current period (∆xt ≡ xt – x0). Clearly, θ ≡ β + γ, so 
the test that γ = 0 becomes a test that θ = β. 
Equations (3) and (4) provide a framework in which to assess whether founding conditions 
matter (“is γ ≠ 0? or is θ ≠ β?”), but it does not enable us to assess whether the effects of 
founding conditions are temporary or permanent. To do this, we must extend (4) to allow θ to 
vary systematically over time. A simple way of achieving this is to express θ as a constant plus a 
term that is linear in age (θ = η+δt) (Disney et al., 2003). This yields 
(5)   log h(t|∆xt , x0)= λt + β∆xt + (η+δt) x0. 
or, if we make it explicit that this specification implies an interaction term between initial   20
conditions and age 
(6)   log h(t|∆xt , x0)= λt + β∆xt + ηx0 + δtx0.  
With this specification, if δ = 0 equation (6) is identical to equation (4), with θ = η, and we 
conclude that the effect of founding conditions on survival is permanent. If δ turns out to be 
different from zero, we expect it to be negative, larger values of δ (in absolute value) implying 
shorter duration of the effects.  
One disadvantage of this specification is that, as t grows larger, the sign of one specific effect 
in x0 can change, as δt may become greater than η in absolute value. A convenient alternative is 
to multiply the regression coefficient by power function, θ = σφ
(t-1), which generalizes (4) to 
(7)   log h(t|∆xt , x0)= λt + β∆xt + σφ
(t-1)x0. 
The speed of erosion of the effect of initial conditions is measured in this specification by the 
parameter φ. If φ = 1, equation (7) is identical to equation (4) with σ = θ, and we conclude that 
the effect of founding conditions on survival is permanent. The smaller φ is, the faster the erosion 
of the effects of initial conditions will be. If φ = 0, then the effects of initial conditions disappear 
almost instantly; i.e. after the founding period, initial conditions do not matter. In contrast, if σ = 
0 initial conditions do not matter at all. Unlike in (6) the effect of founding conditions will 
gradually approach zero as t increases, but will never change sign, which seems to be a desirable 
property for our empirical model. We will use specification (7) as our preferred specification for 
testing the persistence of the effect of founding conditions, using (6) as a robustness check. 
To sum up, equation (7) forms the basis of a model of the determinants of survival odds that 
allows for two drivers of exit: market conditions and firms heterogeneities, measured both at 
founding and at current time.  
V. RESULTS 
In this section we present our empirical results. Before presenting and discussing the results, 
however, let us call the reader’s attention to the fact that all our regressions also include the exit   21
rate in the industry as a control variable. The exit rate in an industry is defined as the number of 
exitors in year t-1 expressed as a proportion of the total number of active firms in the industry in 
that year. As the dependent variable in our models is the probability of exit confronted by newly 
created firms, the exit rate will control for all other industry factors that are not included in the 
regression and that affect exit.  
Table 4 presents our benchmark regression results. The results in Table 4 are based on model 
(2), relating the exit of firms to current conditions. The estimates (of the βs in the model) show 
that current values of the five independent variables – firm size, human capital, the entry rate into 
the firm’s industry, the concentration ratio and current GDP growth – are all relevant 
determinants of survival, in both substantive and statistical senses. Large firms, with more human 
capital, located in concentrated industries with low entry rates, operating during a period of 
macroeconomic growth, are more likely to survive. Of these relationships, that associated with 
concentration is the only one that may cause concern. The results indicate that firms that enter in 
highly concentrated industries are likely to benefit from a price umbrella established by dominant 
firms. Without any further qualifications, this would imply that these industries would become 
less and less concentrated over time, a finding that does not sit well with what is known about the 
persistence of concentration (Davies and Geroski 1997). Given the nature of our discussion about 
the effect of concentration, however, the results for this variable are better appreciated in the 
regressions that follow.  
Further results are shown in Table 5. The table shows three sets of regression estimates based 
on the models (4) to (7). Column (i) shows estimates of (4), which is a model in which both 
initial and current effects are included (if the estimates of θ = γ in (i), then (4) reduces to the null 
hypothesis, (2); column (ii) shows estimates of (7), which allows the effects of initial conditions 
to decay over time. Column (iii) shows estimates of a regression identical to (ii) except that the 
linear specification is used for the decay parameter (model (6)).  
Column (i) shows what happens when initial conditions are added to the equation. In the case 
of all five variables, the hypothesis that θ = β is rejected, either variable by variable or for all five 
independent variables taken together. Therefore, it is not reasonable to simplify the regression 
shown as (i) to the one displayed in Table 4; i.e. there is a clear indication that the null hypothesis 
that solely current conditions matter is inadequate. Column (ii) shows what happens when θ is   22
allowed to decay over time, and it is clear that one should not simplify the regression shown as 
(ii) to (i); i.e. the hypothesis that the effect of initial conditions is permanent is soundly rejected. 
Overall, the hypothesis that the effects are persistent is rejected. The computed chi-squared 
statistic is 72, well above the critical value for a test with 5 degrees of freedom, with a 5 percent 
significance level (11.1). The basis for this inference lies largely with the coefficient of 
concentration, which implies a rapid decay, but also with the effect of initial size. Although the 
estimate of this effect is fairly close to unity, it is also quite precisely measured, and the t-statistic 
for the null hypothesis that this effect is permanent is above 4. The corresponding effect for GDP 
growth is just barely significantly different from one (the t-statistic is 1.67) and the hypotheses 
that the effect of entry and human capital are permanent cannot be rejected.  
ROBUSTNESS  
The final three columns of Table 5 give some information about how robust these results are 
to alternative specifications. The first concern is about our specification of the decay parameter. 
In column (iii) we report the results of using a linear specification as discussed in equation (6). 
Remember that, while for the exponential specification the decay parameter would be one in the 
case of complete persistence, the corresponding value of parameter for total persistence is now 
zero. Inspection of column (iii) reveals that all the qualitative results remain unchanged. All those 
coefficients that were previously statistically significant remain significant and the point 
estimates are pretty much the same, except perhaps in the case of the initial effect of entry. The 
results for persistence are persistent themselves. The hypothesis of full persistence, previously 
rejected for college and entry, is still rejected for these two variables. In column (ii) the results 
indicate that the effect of initial concentration does not persist at all. By construction, the linear 
specification does not allow one to test the hypothesis of no persistence at all. However, using the 
parameter estimates in column (iii) one estimates that the sign of the effect of initial 
concentration reverses before the 4
th year of life. The corresponding time to reversion estimates 
for the other variables are 32, 18, 49, and 11 years for Size, College, Entry and GDP Growth, 
respectively. 
Finally, all our models are estimated with age effects (the λts) to account for the evolution of 
the hazard rates that accompanies the ageing of firms. For the sake of economy, we do not report 
these parameters in Table 5. These effects are, however, graphically displayed in Figure 2 for our   23
preferred specification. These estimates, which do not change much from regression to 
regression, clearly show that the older the firm, the less likely it is to fail. A log-likelihood ratio 
test on the constancy of the baseline hazard function produces a chi-square statistic of 590. This 
soundly rejects the null hypothesis, that is, we find evidence of a liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe 1965, Freeman, Carroll and Hannan 1983). We will come back to this issue below. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
The learning from the results in column (ii) in Table 5 is fairly straightforward. Firms that 
are larger in their initial year of founding will survive longer, and this effect is almost permanent 
(at least for the time span recorded in our data). Furthermore, any subsequent increases in firm 
size improve their survival prospects. This is consistent with a view that posits that firms adjust 
their choice of size as a consequence of the observation of performance in past periods 
(Jovanovic 1982) and it is not consistent with saying that the larger the magnitude of change the 
lower the prospects of survival (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Adjustments in size are, however, 
far from being instantaneous, as indicated by the fact that the effect of initial size is almost 
permanent, thus suggesting that the mechanisms indicated by Hannan and Freeman as reasons for 
firm inertia may indeed apply. 
The impact on firm survival of initial human capital formation also seems to be both 
important and nearly permanent. In contrast, given the effects of founding human capital, it 
seems that subsequent changes in human capital add almost nothing to survival prospects. The 
larger the initial stock of human capital in the firm, the lesser the (permanent) likelihood that the 
firm will exit, but attempts to increase this stock do not lead to sizeable changes in the likelihood 
of exit. This is, perhaps, particularly surprising, as firms adjust the qualifications of their human 
capital quite a lot (correlation of human capital over time is the lowest among all the explanatory 
variables). Although we do not know the details of how these changes are brought about, they are 
likely to be the consequence of labor turnover rather than that of training of a constant set of 
workers. Our results indicate that new hires do not immediately translate their potential into 
improved odds of survival.  
The effect of concentration at the time of entry has a strong negative effect upon the 
probability of exit. However, the effect vanishes almost totally immediately after entry has   24
occurred and the impact of subsequent changes in market concentration is positive and clearly 
significant, a result that fits well the “trial by fire” hypothesis.  
The coefficients on entry are consistent with the argument that competition and excessive 
crowding in markets reduce survival prospects. Firms that are born in years when many other 
firms are also entering their industry are much less likely to survive, and their survival prospects 
are even lower if subsequent entry rates are high. The effect of the founding entry rate is 
persistent, the estimate being even greater than one (although not significantly so). The impacts 
of initial and current entry rates are pretty much the same. This can be seen by noting that when 
the effect of initial conditions is persistent (φ=1 in model 7), as is the case with concentration, the 
impact of initial conditions given current conditions (γ), can be retrieved from the estimated 
coefficients (θ and β) as γ = θ - β. Based on the estimates in column (i) we would have 0.477 
(0.688 - 0.211), while based on column (ii) we have 0.577 (0.624 - 0.047). 
Finally, firms that are born in a boom seem to have almost permanently high survival rates 
ceteris paribus, and survival rates are higher during times in which the economy is growing 
rapidly than in those in which the economy is declining. Again, the effects of initial and current 
conditions are of a comparable magnitude. Indeed, they are -0.026 and -0.020 based on the 
estimates in column (i) and -0.023 and -0.025 based on those in column (ii).  
The results for entry rates and macroeconomic conditions are very similar; both current and 
initial conditions are relevant, and initial conditions exert a permanent effect upon survival. 
While these results support the ecological view that initial conditions matter for survival, they 
seem to indicate that the conditions that affect survival go clearly beyond those that are 
specifically related to the individual markets in which firms operate.  
Figure 1 gives a deeper insight on the issue of persistence, by showing the estimated 
evolution of the magnitude of the effects of the different covariates over the first 25 years of the 
firm’s life. We are well aware that we are estimating the impact of the different covariates at ages 
that we do not observe at all. In doing this exercise, we are assuming that the patterns that we 
uncovered based on the first ten years of life will persist over time. Should the reader be 
uncomfortable with this assumption, (s)he is well advised to concentrate on the far left side of the 
plots. In the four plots (entry is not in the graph, as its effect is estimated to be permanent), one   25
sees that the effects disappear at quite different rates over time. The effect of concentration at 
founding disappears almost immediately after the founding period. A high proportion of the 
effect of initial size still persists after a quarter of a century. Although, by construction, the 
estimated effects never reach zero, it is possible to compute the length of time it takes for each of 
them to reach one half of the initial effect. Simple calculations reveal that Concentration reaches 
this level before the second year of life, while Size, College, and GDP Growth reach it before the 
21st, 10th and 15th year, respectively. 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF INITIAL AND CURRENT CONDITIONS  
To get an idea of what exactly our estimated effects mean for hazard rates, we plotted the 
hazard rates that would be confronted by a firm born in favorable (and unfavorable) conditions in 
Figure 3. The goal with this exercise is to obtain a weighted measure of the different coefficients, 
to appraise the combined effect of the whole set of covariates.  
To construct the “favorable” scenario, we did the following. We calculated the quartiles of 
each explanatory variable in our data. For each variable, we computed the hazard rates over time 
using the first or the third quartile, depending on whether the effect of the variable upon the 
hazards was positive or negative. That is, the favorable scenario is the estimated hazard for a firm 
that is larger than the median, employs a more educated labor force, was created in a period of 
relative prosperity and operates in an industry that is more concentrated and less prone to entry 
than the median. To construct the “unfavorable” scenario, we proceeded symmetrically, i.e. we 
calculated the hazard rates for a firm that is relatively small, employs a labor force which is not 
much educated, was created in a period of recession and operates in an industry that is less 
concentrated and more prone to entry than the median.  
Two different plots were produced and reported in Figure 3. In the first plot we keep current 
conditions constant and appraise the effect of changes in initial conditions (solid line). This plot 
reveals that the impact of initial conditions can be quite substantial. In particular, in the less 
favorable scenario, firms exhibit sizably higher hazard rates than in the most favorable scenario. 
In the second plot we repeated the exercise, holding initial conditions constant and letting current 
conditions vary according to the observed variation in the sample (dotted line). Again, we 
constructed the favorable and unfavorable scenarios following the procedure described above.   26
This new plot reveals that the impact of changing current conditions is also non-negligible.  
This exercise allows one to compare the magnitude of the impact of current and initial 
conditions upon survival. At birth, current and initial conditions are the same. Accordingly, the 
two plots are identical for age 1. As firms age, the variability in the hazard rates that can be 
attributed to founding conditions – measured by the difference between the two dotted lines – as 
well as the one that can be attributed to current conditions - measured by the difference between 
the two solid lines – is reduced. Figure 4 displays this information in a direct manner. After the 
first year, the series for current conditions in Figure 4 is essentially horizontal, while the series for 
founding conditions is decreasing. This means that the relative weight of founding conditions is 
at a maximum during the first years of life. However, even after ten years of life, founding 
conditions have a non-negligible impact upon the variability of hazard rates. Between the eighth 
and the tenth years, the difference between the hazard rate in the less and the most favorable 
scenarios are of 6 percentage points for current conditions and 5 percentage points for founding 
conditions.  
It is useful to note that the drivers of the changes in the hazard rates over time are different in 
the two plots. There is, of course, a common element in both plots, the effect of ageing, as 
measured by the common baseline hazard function parameters (which, however, does not affect 
the series in Figure 4). Apart from this, in the first plot the estimated changes in the hazard rates 
are driven by the estimated decays in the effects of the initial conditions. As these decays are, in 
general, small, their compounded effect is also relatively small. On the other hand, in the second 
plot the estimated changes in the hazard rates are driven by the observed changes in the 
covariates; in this plot firms face different hazard rates because at different points in time they 
face different conditions.  
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we explored the issue of whether the conditions into which a firm is born have 
an effect on its survival chances, which founding conditions matter most, and how long their 
effects last. We applied a structured set of statistical models to data on more than 118,000 
Portuguese firms over the period 1983 - 1993, and uncovered very strong evidence that initial 
conditions matter. Indeed, it was very easy to reject the hypothesis that only current conditions   27
matter; after taking current conditions into account, founding conditions contribute significantly 
to explain the variation in survival rates. 
We were also able to reject the hypothesis that founding effects are permanent, finding that 
the effect of initial conditions decreases as time goes by. However, although their effect is not 
permanent strictu sensu, many factors (firm size, human capital, entry rates and GDP growth) 
seem to have relatively long-lived effects on survival. Indeed, despite the fact that the effect of 
founding conditions upon survival decreases over time, founding conditions still contribute very 
significantly to explaining the observed variation in firm survival rates a few years after birth. It 
is worth mentioning here that we observe our firms for ten years at most. Under these 
circumstances, "permanent" means something rather less than "forever". At most, what we have 
observed is that founding effects persist relatively unaltered (except for the concentration effect) 
through the first 10 years of a new firm's life. How much longer they last is an open question. All 
of these results point to the conclusion that firms bear scars from the conditions of their birth, 
possibly for at least 10 years after they are born. Further, our simulations show that these effects 
are far from negligible and, at least in the first years after founding, the effects associated with 
founding values of the independent variables are greater than the effects associated with current 
values. 
For policy makers, this is sobering news. It is often possible to affect the current market 
conditions that a firm operates in, but it is never possible to go back in history and alter the 
conditions under which it was born. That is, the importance of founding effects means that there 
are inherent limits to what policy makers can do for young struggling firms. It also suggests that 
policy makers ought to sharply distinguish between neo-natal and post-natal policies, and perhaps 
focus rather more of their energy on the former than the latter. For managers, a similar caveat 
applies. When one is going to set up a new firm, it is important to establish it properly from the 
beginning. Founding conditions have long-lasting effects upon survival, and subsequent reversal 
of the initial decisions later on may be insufficient to produce the desired improvement in the 
probabilities of survival. 
REFERENCES 
Agarwal, R., Echambadi, R., Franco, A.M., and Sarkar, MB, (2004), “Knowledge Transfer through 
Inheritance: Spin-Out Generation, Development and Survival”, Academy of Management Journal, 47,   28
(4), 501--522 
Argote, L. and McEvily, B. and Reagans, R., (2003), “Managing Knowledge in Organizations: An 
Integrative Framework and Review of Emerging Themes”, Management Science, 49, (4), 571--582  
Audia, P.; E. Locke and K. Smith (2000) “The Paradox of Success: An Archival and Laboratory Study of 
Strategic Persistence Following Radical Environmental Change" Academy of Management Journal, 
43, 837-853. 
Audretsch, D., and T. Mahmood (1994) “The Rate of Hazard Confronting New Firms and Plants in US 
Manufacturing”, Review of Industrial Organization, 9, 41 – 56. 
Barney J (1991) “Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage”, Journal of Management, 17, 34-56 
Bertin, A.; Bresnahan, T.; Raff, D. (1996) “Localized Competition and the Aggregation of Plant-Level 
Increasing Returns: Blast Furnaces, 1929-1935” Journal of Political Economy; 104(2), 241-66.  
Boeker, W., (1989(, Strategic Change: “The Effects of Founding and History”, Academy of Management 
Journal, 32, 3, 489—515 
Boeri T, Bellmann L (1995) “Post-entry Behavior and the Cycle: Evidence from Germany”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 483-500  
Burton, M. D. and C. Beckman (2007) “Leaving a Legacy: Position Imprints and Successor Turnover in 
Young Firms”. American Sociological Review72, 239-266,  
Bogner W, Thomas H, McGee J, (1996), "A Longitudinal Study of the Competitive Positions and Entry 
Paths of European Firms in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Market", Strategic Management Journal, 17, 85 
– 107. 
Bunch D, Smiley R (1992) “Who Deters Entry? Evidence on the Use of Strategic Entry Deterrents” Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 74, 509-521 
Burgelman, R. (1994) “Fading Memories: A Process Theory of Strategic Business Exit in Dynamic 
Environments”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 24-56 
Caballero, R. J.; Hammour, M.L. (1994) “The Cleansing Effect of Recessions”, American Economic 
Review; 84(5), 1350-68. 
Cabral, L, (1995), Sunk Costs, “Firm Size and Firm Growth”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 43, 161--
172 
Cabral L and J Mata (2003), “On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution: Facts and Theory”, American 
Economic Review, 93, 1075—1090 
Carroll, G. and M Hannan (1989) “Density Delay in the Evolution of Organizational Populations”,   29
Administrative Science Quarterly, 34, 411 – 430. 
Chang, S  (1996) “An Evolutionary Perspective on Diversification and Corporate Restructuring: Entry, Exit 
and Economics Performance During 1981-89” Strategic Management Journal, 17, 587-611 
Cooper, A.; F. Gimeno-Gascon and C. Woo (1994) “Initial Human and Financial Capital as Predictors of 
New Venture Performance”, Journal of Business Venturing, 9, 371 – 395. 
Davies, S.W. and Geroski, P.A., (1997), “Changes in Concentration, Turbulence, and the Dynamics of 
Market Shares”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 3, 383--391 
Delmar, F. and Shane, S., (2004), “Legitimating First: Organizing Activities and the Survival of New 
Ventures”, Journal of Business Venturing, 19, (S 385), 385-410 
Diamond DW (1989), “Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 4, 828-
-862 
Dixit A, and R Pindyck (1994) Investment under Uncertainty, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
Dunne, T., M. Roberts and L. Samuelson (1988) “Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in US Manufacturing 
Plants”, Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 495 – 515. 
Dunne T, Roberts M, Samuelson L (1989) “The Growth and Failure of U.S. Manufacturing Plants”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 671 – 698 
Eaton, B. and R. Lipsey (1980) “Entry Barriers are Exit Barriers: the Durability of Capital as a Barrier to 
Entry”, Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 721-729 
Eisenhardt K, Schoonhoven C (1990) “Organizational Growth - Linking Founding Team, Strategy, 
Environment, and Growth Among United-States Semiconductor Ventures, 1978-1988” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 504-529  
Evans, D.; Leighton, L. (1989), “Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship” The American Economic 
Review, 79, 519-526 
Fazzari S, R Hubbard and B Petersen (1988) “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 141 – 206 
Freeman J, G Carroll and M Hannan (1983) “The Liability of Newness - Age Dependence in Organizational 
Death Rates” American Sociological Review, 48, 692-710  
Frank M (1988) “An Intertemporal Model of Industrial Exit” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 333 – 
344. 
Gimeno J, Folta T, Cooper A, Woo C (1997) “Survival of the fittest? Entrepreneurial human capital and the 
persistence of underperforming firms”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 750-783   30
Gort, M. and S Klepper (1982) “Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations”, Economic Journal, 
92, 630 – 653. 
Hannan, M, (1998), "Rethinking Age Dependence in Organizational Mortality: Logical Formalizations", 
American Journal of Sociology, 104, 126 – 164.  
Hannan, M. and G. Carroll (1992) Dynamics of Organizational Populations, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 
Hannan M. and J. Freeman, (1977) “The Population Ecology of Organizations”, American Journal of 
Sociology, 82, 929-964 
Hannan, MT J Freeman (1984) “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change”, American Sociological 
Review, 49, 149-164 
Hannan Michael T. and John Freeman (1987) “The Ecology of Organizational Mortality: American Labor 
Unions, 1836-1985” American Journal of Sociology, 94, 25-52 
Hatch NW, Dyer JH (2004) “Human Capital and Learning as a Source of Sustainable Competitive 
Advantage”, Strategic Management Journal, 25 (12): 1155-1178  
Haverman H (1995) “The Demographic Metabolism of Organizations: Industry Dynamics, Turnover, and 
Tenure Distributions”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 586-618 
Henderson, A. (1999) “Firm Strategy and Age Dependence: A Contingent View of the Liabilities of 
Newness, Adolescence and Obsolescence”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 281 – 314.  
Highfield, R. and Smiley, R. (1987) New Business Starts and Economics Activity, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 5(1), 51-66 
Huyghebaert, N. and Van de Gucht, L.M., (2004), Incumbent strategic behavior in financial markets and the 
exit of entrepreneurial start-ups, Strategic Management Journal, 25, (7), 669—688 
Ilmakunnas, P.; Topi, J.(1999) “Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Influences on Entry and Exit of 
Firms”, Review of Industrial Organization; 15(3), 283-301. 
Jovanovic, B. (1982) “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”, Econometrica, 50, 649 – 670. 
Kimberly. J. (1979) "Issues in the Creation of Organisations: Initiation, Innovation, and Institutionalisation" 
Academy of Management Journal, 22, 437-457. 
Klepper S, (1996) “Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle”, American Economic 
Review, 86 (3): 562-583  
Klepper, S. (2002), “Firm Survival and the Evolution of Oligopoly”, RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 1, 
37--61   31
  Kraatz, M.S. and Zajac, E.J., (2001), “How Organizational Resources Affect Strategic Change and 
Performance in Turbulent Environments: Theory and Evidence”, Organization Science, 12, (5), 632--
657 
Levinthal D (1997) “Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes” Management Science, 43, 934-950 
Lancaster T (1990) The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Levitt, B. and March, J.G.(1988), Organizational Learning, Annual Review of Sociology, (14), 1, 319—338 
Lucas, Jr, Robert E, (1978), On the Size Distribution of Business Firms, Bell Journal of Economics, 9 2, 
508—523 
Mata, J and P Portugal (2002) “The Survival of New Domestic and Foreign Owned Firms”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 23, 323-343 
Mata, J. (1996) “Business Conditions and Business Starts”, International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, 3(3), 295-305 
Mata, J. and P. Portugal (1994) “Life Duration of New Firms”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 42, 227-
246. 
Mata, J., P. Portugal and P. Guimarães (1995) “The Survival of New Plants: Start-up Conditions and Post-
Entry Evolution”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 459 – 481. 
McEvily and Chakravarthy (2002), “The Persistence of Knowledge-Based Advantage: An Empirical Test 
For Product Performance and Technological Knowledge”, Strategic Management Journal, 23, (4), 
285—305 
Miller, D. and Chen, M.J., (1994), “Sources and Consequences of Competitive Inertia: A Study of the US 
Airline Industry”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, (1), 1-23 
Mitchell, W. (1994) “The Dynamics of Evolving Markets: The Effects of Business Sales and Age on 
Dissolutions and Divestitures”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 575 – 602. 
Nadler, J. and Thompson, L. and Boven, L.V., (2003) “Learning Negotiation Skills: Four Models of 
Knowledge Creation and Transfer”, Management Science, 49 (4), 529—540 
Nelson R, and Winter S, (1982(, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press  
Nelson, T., (2003), “The Persistence of Founder Influence: Management, Ownership, and Performance 
Effects at Initial Public Offerings”, Strategic Management Journal, (24), 8, 707—724 
Nickel MN, and Fuentes JM, (2004), “Relationship between Legitimation, Competition and Organizational 
Death: Current State of the Art,” International Journal of Management Reviews 5-6 (1): 43-62 2004   32
Penrose E., (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, New York, Wiley. 
Pfeiffer, F.; Reize, F. (2000) “Business Start-ups by the Unemployed – An Econometric Analysis Based on 
Firm Data” Labour Economics; 7, 629-63. 
Ranger-Moore, J. (1997) “Bigger May be Better but is Older Wiser?”, American Sociological Review, 62, 
903 – 920.  
Romanelli, E. (1989) "Environments and Strategies at Start-up: Effects on Early Survival, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 34, 369 - 387. 
Sharma, A. and Kesner I. (1996) “Diversifying Entry: Some Ex Ante Explanations for Post-Entry Survival 
and Growth”, Academy of Management Journal, 39, 635 – 677 
Siegfried J, Evans L (1994) “Empirical Studies of Entry and Exit: A Survey of the Evidence” Review of 
Industrial Organization, 9, 121-156 
Simonin, B.L. (2004) “An Empirical Investigation of the Process of Knowledge Transfer in International 
Strategic Alliances”, Journal of International Business Studies, 35(5), 407 - 427 
Stinchcombe, A. (1965 "Social Structures and Organizations" in J. March (Ed.), Handbook of 
Organizations, Chicago, Rand McNally, 142-193 
 Suárez, F. and Utterback J.. (1995) “Dominant Designs and the Survival of Firms”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 16, 415 – 430 
Swaminathan, A. (1996) “Environmental Conditions at Founding and Organizational Mortality: A Trial by 
Fire Model”, Academy of Management Journal, 39, 1350 – 1379. 
Teece D (1998) “Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets; The New Economy, Markets for Know-How 
and Intangible Assets” California Management Review, 40, 55-79 
Uzzi, B, (1997) “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness”, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, (1, 35-67 
Wernerfelt R (1984) “A Resource-Based View of the Firm”, Strategic Management Journal, 5, 171-180 
Winter, S. (1994) “Schumpetarian Competition in Alternative Technological Regimes”, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 5, 287 – 320 
Youndt M, Snell S, Dean J, Lepak D (1996) “Human Resource Management, Manufacturing Strategy and 
Firm Performance” Academy of Management Journal, 39, 836 – 866 
Zajac, E.J. and Kraatz, M.S. and Bresser, R.K.F., (2000), “Modelling the Dynamics of Strategic Fit: A 
Normative Approach to Strategic Change”, Strategic Management Journal, 21, (4), 429--453 
Zingales L (1998) Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest? Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry,   33
Journal of Finance, 533 905-938   34
 
Table 1 -  Survival rates  
 
          Survival rates after x years (%)
C o h o r t  F i r m s  12345678   9 1 0
1983 7829 75 65 56 49 44 40 37 34 32 30
1984 6752 77 63 51 44 41 37 35 32 30
1985 6594 75 64 57 51 46 42 39 36 
1986 8811 80 70 62 56 52 48 44  
1987 10880 81 71 63 57 52 48  
1988 13356 82 71 63 57 52  
1989 15633 80 70 63 57  
1990  
1991 16161 81 71  




Table 2 - Independent variables: 
Descriptive statistics 
 
     Standard              
 Mean Deviation Correlations
        






Size 4.461 9.424 1
College 0.018 0.098 0.032 1
Entry rate  0.182 0.064 0.002 0.018 1
Concentration 0.017 0.060 0.058 0.061 0.233 1
GDP growth  2.954 2.913 0.043 -0.012 0.22 0.001 1





Table  - 3 Correlations between the values of the independent variables at founding and at later times
 
  Size  College Entry rate Concentration Exit rate
       1 year         0.810   0.648 0.821  0.776 0.606
2 years 0.680   0.498 0.747  0.643 0.572
3 years 0.548   0.406 0.727  0.602 0.559
4 years 0.550   0.332 0.694  0.572 0.479
5 years 0.523   0.328 0.680  0.549 0.402
6 years 0.487   0.339 0.638  0.541 0.415
7 years 0.449   0.362 0.621  0.557 0.377
8 years 0.430   0.424 0.574  0.521 0.26
9 years 0.483   0.364 0.562  0.553 0.272
10 years 0.513   0.322 0.451  0.536 0.254
   35
 





Entry rate  0.397 0.080
Concentration -0.486 0.069
GDP growth  -0.039 0.002
Exit rate  3.612 0.102
LL -161063 
   36
 
    Table 5 - Regression results (n=118110)   
   (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
        
Variable Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
        
S i z e         
   Initial  -0.334  0.005 -0.352 0.007 -0.351 0.007
   Decay      0.965 0.008 0.011 0.002
   Change  -0.637  0.009 -0.630 0.009 -0.631 0.009
C o l l e g e         
   Initial  -0.481  0.054 -0.516 0.066 -0.513 0.063
   Decay      0.922 0.065 0.029 0.024
   Change  0.033  0.075 0.067 0.078 0.056 0.077
Entry  rate        
   Initial  0.624  0.085 0.688 0.051 0.695 0.096
   Decay      1.015 0.051 -0.014 0.036
   Change  0.047  0.110 0.211 0.121 0.118 0.122
Concentration       
   Initial  -0.404  0.071 -0.970 0.096 -0.655 0.083
   Decay      0.006 0.192 0.187 0.031
   Change  -0.211  0.146 0.117 0.134 0.167 0.159
GDP  growth        
   Initial  -0.046  0.002 -0.048 0.002 -0.049 0.002
   Decay      0.950 0.030 0.005 0.001
   Change  -0.026  0.002 -0.023 0.003 -0.019 0.003
        
Exit rate  3.219  0.105 3.389 0.115 3.285 0.109
        
LL  -158731 -158689 -158695 
        
            
The estimate of the decay in column (iii) follows a linear specification (equation (6) in the main text)
   37
 




















































































Figure 3: The impact of founding and 














Figure 4: The impact of founding and current 
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